Governors and Local Tax Deficits in the Kangxi Reign

LIU Feng-Yun

Studies in Qing History ›› 2009, Vol. 0 ›› Issue (3) : 28-38+106.

PDF(2659 KB)
PDF(2659 KB)
Studies in Qing History ›› 2009, Vol. 0 ›› Issue (3) : 28-38+106.

Governors and Local Tax Deficits in the Kangxi Reign

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Abstract

Local tax deficits were increasingly widespread during the middle and late Kangxi reign. An investigation of the various reasons for these deficits reveals that they were closely related to local finance, treasury regulations and official discipline. Owing to the lack of regulations governing retention and storage of taxes and the absence of timely supervision, dishonest officials had convenient opportunities for embezzlement. Governors, being responsible for supervision of the provinces, were directly to blame for not monitoring tax collection and for not investigating and not punishing malpractices. Individual integrity and talent could not prevent deficits, and there were many governors who were punished for their own misappropriations as well as for failing to impeach or for sheltering the offenders. Thus, given that existing institutional defects were the source of these deficits, it it was impossible to limit the tax deficits in the Kangxi reign.

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LIU Feng-Yun. Governors and Local Tax Deficits in the Kangxi Reign[J]. Studies in Qing History. 2009, 0(3): 28-38+106
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