Abstract: County governments played a very important role in the salt administration and the collection of salt taxes in the Qing dynasty. Local officials were responsible for selling salt and suppressing smuggling locally，while the central government designed strict tests on the salt law to ensure that the system works out. But counties had no independent administrative power in the institutional system of Qing dynasty，so they were often put into passive positions in the salt administration operation. The“conversion of the salt tax into a poll tax”in Dongguan County, Guangdong Province from the Kangxi to Qianlong Reign，was the result of mediating the conflicts between the superior policy from central government and the actual operation at the local level. This institutional change was the result of a process represented the local rejection of the orthodox salt law and the acquiescence of the central government for the reality of the daily operation of policies at the county level. This process has shown that in order to deal with the central government’s inspection of the administration of the salt law，county officers often took advantage of the change of political situations and flaws in the institutional system. Specifically, local officials sought to a balance between the central government and themselves，to achieve the purpose of changing local salt law, and ultimately ensuring the effective operations of the salt administration and the collection of salt tax in the Qing dynasty．  

摘要： 州县在清代盐政和保障盐税征收中至为重要，负有地方通商疏引的职责，朝廷对州县官也有严
格的盐法考成。但由于清代制度设计中地方州县没有独立地位，因此在盐政的日常运作中常常处于被动。康乾时期广东东莞县 “盐入粮丁” (将盐课派入田亩) 的事件，就是在上级政策与州县实际之间的矛盾激发下进行制度调整的结果，是一个从不符合朝廷盐法，到在州县的日常运作中逐渐得到默许的政策。这一过程表明，州县官在盐法考成的压力下，时常借助时势变化和对制度的因应利用，通过寻求州县与上层制度之间的博弈点和利益契机，达到适时调整地方盐法的目的，从而保障有清一代盐政的有效运作和盐税的正常完纳。